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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
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DeAnn H. Johnson, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Bin 1 f of Appellee 
^T \TEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from three convictions tor obtaining a prescription for a 
controlledsu bstanceund-: :J-.-^ , \ V ; _ >. i.-^ s .-.-.".:;.::-.-ur^uu ; .: „. i 
i ink" M mi 11 ih» \ I 103(2)fe^ 
r
 * -TVIFV1 -"^THFIISSITFS 
Defendant claims the physician-patient privilege bars a doctor from testifying 
that a patient tailed to in form, him she was contemporaneoit isl) ot taining 
IVfeml.inf's lis c issues into l\\ n • III Il restates llie issues lis Inline 
1. Did the trial court correctly conclude that Defendant's failure to tell her 
doctor that she had multiple prescriptions for 'the same narcotics was not a 
privileged communication under rule 506, Utah Rules of Evidence, the physician-
patient privilege?1 
Standard of Review. Whether privilege bars the admission of evidence is a 
mixed question of law and fact; the trial court's legal conclusion is reviewed for 
correctness and its underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Fox v. 
Brigham Young University, 2007 UT App 406,113,176 P.3d 446. 
2. Alternatively, did the trial court correctly conclude that Defendant's failure 
to disclose was not privileged under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-6(9) (West 2004), the 
drug-fraud exception to the physician-patient privilege?2 
Standard of Review. Whether a pre-existing statutory privilege exception 
conflicts with a privilege rule is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness 
on appeal. Fox, 2007 UT App 406, f 12; Utah R. Evid. 501. Underlying factual 
determinations are reviewed for clear error. Id. at Iffl 12-13. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following determinative provisions are attached in Addendum A, together 
with other provisions cited in argument: 
Utah R. Evid. 501; 
Utah R. Evid. 506; 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-6 (West 2004). 
1
 See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt], Issues II-V. 
2
 See Br.Aplt., Issue I. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 2006, Defendant was charged with five counts of obtaining a prescription 
for a controlled substance under false pretenses, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii) (West 2004) (R. 1-3). The charges arose from 
prescriptions for oxycodone and hydrocodone that Defendant obtained from Dr. W. 
Reed Jaussi, M.D. (R281:9-14). In a second case, Defendant was charged with two 
counts of fraudulently obtaining narcotic prescriptions from other doctors and one 
count of attempting to make or alter a false prescription (R. 201; R286:2-5; R287:2). 
At the preliminary hearing in this case, the signed statement of Dr. Jaussi was 
admitted into evidence (R281: 10-14). The doctor stated that when Defendant 
obtained the narcotic prescriptions from him, she failed to inform him that she was 
contemporaneously obtaining prescriptions for the same narcotics from other 
doctors (R281:10). Defendant objected to the admission of the doctor's statement, 
claiming that her failure to reveal that she had multiple prescriptions for narcotics 
was protected from disclosure under rule 506, the physician-patient privilege (R281: 
10-11 & 13). The magistrate found that the failure to disclose (1) was not a 
communication as defined in rule 506, because no information was communicated 
and (2) was not done for purposes of diagnosis or treatment as required by rule 506, 
3
 Oxycodone and hydrocodone are narcotic painkillers similar to codeine. See 
http://www.medicinenet.com. 
3 
but to perpetrate a fraud (R281: 13-14). See Add. A. (Rule). Consequently, the 
magistrate concluded that Defendant's failure to disclose was not protected by rule 
506's physician-patient privilege and admitted Dr. Jaussi's statement (R281:13-14). 
The magistrate further found the preliminary hearing evidence—consisting of the 
doctor's statement, the testimony of a narcotics detective, and pharmaceutical 
records revealing the multiple narcotics prescriptions — established probable cause 
to believe that Defendant procured the prescriptions from Dr. Jaussi under false 
pretenses and bound the case over for trial (R281: 20-21). 
Defendant moved to quash the bindover order (R. 41-42). In a series of 
memoranda, Defendant again argued that Dr. Jaussi's statement was inadmissible 
under rule 506 and claimed that without the doctor's statement, there was 
insufficient evidence to support bindover (R. 43-51,96-109). 
The prosecutor responded that Defendant's failure to disclose was not a 
privileged communication under rule 506 and, in any case, the drug-fraud exception 
in section 58-37-6(9) exempted from privilege, communications made to unlawfully 
procure the administration of drugs (R. 57-65,90-95). Defendant then claimed that 
rule 506 superseded and nullified section 58-37-6(9) and that the statutory exception 
violated the separation of powers clause, Utah Constitution, article V, § 1 (R. 73-81, 
114-16 &120-26). See Add. A (Statute & Constitutional Provision). The trial court 
concluded that Defendant's failure to disclose was not privileged under rule 506 
4 
and, in any case, was exempted from privilege under section 58-37-6(9), which the 
court concluded was not nullified by the rule and was constitutional pursuant to the 
rulemaking provision, Utah Constitution, article VIII, § 4 (R. 128-31). The court 
found that the preliminary hearing evidence supported bindover and denied the 
motion to quash (id.). See Add. A (Constitutional Provision) & Addendum B (Denial 
of Motion to Quash). 
Defendant then filed a motion in limine that, as relevant to this appeal, re-
raised the same arguments as the motion to quash. Compare R. 67-71,120-26,114-16, 
with R. 161-80. The trial court refused to reconsider its prior ruling and denied the 
motion in limine (R. 219-21). See Addendum C (Denial of Motion in Limine). 
On September 11,2007, Defendant pled guilty to Counts I-III, reserving her 
right to appeal the denials of the motion to quash and motion in limine (R. 231-40).4 
Pursuant to the plea bargain, the remaining two counts in this case, as well as the 
three counts in the other case, were dismissed (R. 257; R287: 2). 
On October 23, 2007, Defendant was sentenced to three concurrent terms of 
zero-to-five-years imprisonment (R. 247-50; R288: 5-6). The sentences were 
suspended and Defendant placed on probation, upon condition she serve 365 days 
4
 Because the arguments in the motion in limine duplicate those raised in the 
motion to quash, the State will only refer to the ruling denying the motion to quash 
in the argument portion of this brief. 
5 
in jail and other terms (id.). Defendant timely appealed and, pursuant to the plea 
bargain, was released pending appeal (R. 259 & 267; R287: 2; R288: 5-6). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS5 
Beginning in 2004 and continuing through 2005, Defendant obtained multiple 
prescriptions for oxycodone and hydrocodone from at least four doctors (R. 1-3 & 
201; R281: 7 & 15-19; R286: 2-5; R287: 2). 
Pharmacies filing narcotics prescriptions are required to maintain records of 
the doctors who prescribed the drugs, the amounts prescribed, the dates when 
dispensed, and the patient/recipients' names and other identifying information 
(R281: 5). These pharmaceutical records are compiled and maintained in the Utah 
State Controlled Substances Data Base (R281: 5). State narcotics investigators may 
access the information by providing a suspect's name, date of birth, and an 
investigative case number (id.).6 See also Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-7.5 (West 2004) 
(Add. A). 
5
 The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings 
and ruling. See Pro-Max Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 250 n.l (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 943 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). 
6
 Defendant concedes that the pharmaceutical records are not privileged. 
BrAplt. at 17. 
6 
In this case, the database records established that Defendant received at least 
nine prescriptions for oxycodone or hydrocodone from at least four doctors during a 
ten-month period (R. 112 & 161-62; R281: 6-7,15-19 & 21): 
(1) In Fall 2004, Defendant obtained and filled prescriptions for 
oxycodone and/or hydrocodone from Dr. Bedell (R. 58,112 & 61). 
(2) On December 6, 2004, Defendant obtained and filled a 
prescription for hydrocodone from Dr. Heaton (R. 112). 
(3) On December 9,2004, she obtained and filled a prescription 
for hydrocodone from Dr. Heaton (id.). 
(4) On January 20,2005, Defendant obtained and filled a prescription 
for hydrocodone from Dr. Bedell (id.). 
(5) On January 24, 2005, she obtained and filled a prescription for 
hydrocodone from Dr. Garg (id.). 
(6) On May 18,20,22,23 & 25,2005, Defendant obtained prescriptions 
for hydrocodone from Dr. Bedell (R. 58). 
(7) On June 7, 2004, she obtained and filled a prescription ; >r 
hydrocodone from Dr. Jaussi (R. 58,121; R281:18). 
(8) On June 24,2005, Defendant obtained and filled a prescription for 
135 hydrocodone tablets from Dr. Bedell (R. 112). 
(9) On June 28, 2005, Defendant obtained and filled a prescription for 
Endocet from Dr. Jaussi (R. 112; R281:18). Endocet is a trade name for a form 
of oxycodone (R. 58). 
This same pattern continued throughout July, August and September (R281:18). 
The pattern supports that the multiple prescriptions were being fraudulently 
obtained (R281: 7). 
7 
Dr. Jaussi stated that in prescribing the narcotics, he was unaware that 
Defendant was contemporaneously obtaining the same narcotics from other doctors 
(R281: 10-14). Consequently, when Dr. Jaussi twice prescribed hydrocodone or 
oxycodone in June, he was unaware that Defendant had obtained six other 
prescriptions for hydrocodone from Dr. Bedell from mid-May to the end of June. 
A narcotics detective interviewed Defendant (R281:14-15). He asked her if 
she had told the doctors that she was obtaining narcotics from other sources (R281: 
15). She claimed Dr. Bedell knew (id.): Defendant initially asserted that she also told 
Dr. Jaussi's nurse, but when the detective said Dr. Jaussi had no idea she was 
obtaining narcotics from another source, Defendant admitted that "maybe she 
didn't teUhim"(zd.). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Though raised in five issues, Defendant's argument is really two-fold. 
Defendant argues that her failure to disclose is a privileged communication under 
rule 506, the physician-patient privilege. And, she claims that rule 506 supersedes 
and nullifies section 58-37-6(9), the drug-fraud exception to the physician-patient 
privilege, which exception Defendant also asserts is unconstitutional. The 
contentions are without merit. 
Rule 506. Rule 506 protects from disclosure only information that is 
communicated in confidence to a doctor for purposes of diagnosis or treatment. 
8 
Here, the trial court properly concluded that no privilege existed under the rule, 
after correctly finding that: (1) Defendant's failure to disclose did not communicate 
information, but concealed it, and (2) her failure to disclose was not done for 
purposes of diagnosis or treatment, but to perpetrate a fraud. This Court need not 
address the merits of Defendant's rule 506 argument, however, because she has not 
complied with the briefing and marshaling requirements in rule 24, Utah Rules of 
Appellant Procedure. 
Defendant's related argument—that the preliminary hearing evidence is 
insufficient to support bindover—should also be summarily rejected because 
Defendant fails to marshal the evidence that supports i lie bindover. Even i f the 
merits are considered, the preliminary hearing evidence establishes probable cause 
to believe that Defendant obtained narcotics from Dr. Jaussi under false pretenses 
and, consequently, the trial court properly denied the motion to quash the bindover. 
Section 58-37-6(9). Section 58-37-6(9) declares that a communication made to 
unlawfully procure the administration of drugs is not a privileged communication. 
Defendant argues that rule 506 renders section 58-37-6(9) void. She also claims that 
legislatively enacted evidentiary provisions, like section 58-37-6(9), violate the 
separation of powers clause in article V, section 1, of the Utah Constitution, even 
though article VIII, section 4, grants the legislature authority to amend evidentiary 
rules, like rule 506. Utah appellate courts have not fully addressed the parameters 
9 
of the legislature's authority to make or amend rules. Burns v. Boy den, 2006 UT14, \ 
15 n.3,133 P.3d 370. Nevertheless, it is unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue 
because this case is fully resolved under precedent and the plain language of the 
privilege rules. 
Pursuant to rule 501, Utah Rules of Evidence, no privileges are recognized in 
Utah except for those provided for by the state constitution or judicially-adopted by 
evidentiary rule or legislatively-enacted in " existing statutory provisions not in 
conflict with" the rules. Rule 506's physician-patient privilege rule and section 58-
37-6(9)'s drug-fraud exception do not conflict. State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 86, 89 
(Utah App. 1998). The trial court properly relied on this authority in concluding 
that no privilege exists here under either the rule or the exception. 
Thus, Dr. Jaussi's statement is not barred by privilege and the statement, 
together with the other preliminary hearing evidence, supports the bindover. The 
motion to quash was properly denied. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Rule 506(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides a general rule of privilege for 
"information... communicated [to a physician] in confidence and for the purpose 
of diagnosing or treating" a patient. See Add. A. The rule lists three exceptions that 
are not applicable here. See Utah R. Evid. 506(d). Another exception exists, 
10 
however, in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-6(9) (West 2004), which provides that "any 
information communicated to [a physician]... in an attempt to unlawfully procure, 
or to procure the administration of, a controlled substance is not considered to be a 
privileged communication/, See Add. A. The trial court relied on rule 506 and, 
alternatively, section 58-37-6(9) in correctly concluding that Defendant's failure to 
disclose to Dr. Jaussi the existence of multiple narcotics prescriptions was not a 
privileged communication (R. 128-31) (Add. B), 
Defendant attacks the court's conclusion by first arguing that the drug-fraud 
exception in section 58-37-6(9) is unconstitutional and void. Br.Aplt at 6-13. She 
claims that the separation of powers provision, article V, § I of the [ Jtah 
Constitution, precludes any legislative enactment of an evidentiary provision, even 
though the rulemaking provision, article VIII, § 4, grants the legislature such 
authority.7 Br.Aplt at 8-11. As will be discussed in Point II, section 58-37-6(9)'s drug 
fraud exception was not superseded by adoption of rule 506, but remains in full 
7
 Article V, section 1, the separation of powers clause, directs that Utah's 
government "shall be divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the 
Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions 
appertaining to either of the others, except in the case herein expressly directed or 
permitted/' 
Article VIII, section 4, bestows rulemaking powers on the Supreme Court, 
but also grants the Legislature authority to "amend the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members 
of both houses of the Legislature/' See Add. A. 
11 
force and effect. In discussing the constitutional validity of the statutory exception 
before addressing whether a privilege exists, Defendant places her cart before her 
horse. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, % 26,52 P.3d 1158 (recognizing that resolution 
of "constitutional issues should be avoided if a case can be properly decided on non-
constitutional grounds"); State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, f 12 n.4, 60 P.2d 582 
(same). 
In this case, there is no constitutional issue to resolve. As will be discussed in 
Point I, the plain language of rule 506 establishes that no privilege exists. 
Alternatively, as will be discussed in Point II, rule 501, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
establishes the continuing validity of existing privilege statutes not in conflict with 
the privilege rules. Section 58-37-6(9) is such a provision. See State v. Anderson, 972 
P.2d 86,88-89 (Utah App. 1998). Consequently, the trial court correctly concluded 
that neither the rule nor the exception allow Defendant to claim privilege to conceal 
fraud (R. 130). Dr. Jaussi's statement is admissible and the statement, together with 
the other preliminary hearing evidence, supports the bindover. Defendant's motion 
to quash, therefore, was properly denied.8 
8
 In denying the motion, the trial court followed Defendant's lead and 
mistakenly addressed the separation of powers argument before concluding there 
was no privilege (R. 128-31) (Add. B). See also Bailey, 2002 UT 58, ^ 26; Bickley, 2002 
UT App 342, % 12 n.4. Though the constitutional discussion was unnecessary, the 




THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT NO 
PRIVILEGE ATTACHED UNDER RULE 506; THEREFORE, THE 
DOCTOR'S STATEMENT WAS ADMISSIBLE AND THE 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTED BINDOVER 
Defendant claims that: the trial court srred i /hen it concluded 'that 
Defendant's failure to disclose her multiple narcotics prescriptions was not 
privileged under rule 506, the physician-patient privilege rule. BrAplt at 12-23. She 
also argues that the court erred in ruling Dr. Jaussi's statement was admissible and 
in concluding that the preliminary hearing evidence supported bindover. Id. 
Defendant's contentions are without merit. The trial court's privilege rulings are 
correct and the denial of the motion to quash proper. 
A. Defendant's failure to comply with rule 24 justifies summary 
rejection of her rule 506 claim. 
This Court, however, need not consider the merits of Defendant's rule 506 
argument because she fails to meet the marshaling and briefing requirements in rule 
24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellal Procedure. See State v. Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 t JT 
App 191,1 7,186 P.3d 1023. 
Whether privilege bars the admission of evidence is a mixed question of law 
and fact. Fox v. Brigham Young University, 2007 UT App 406, f 13,176 P.3d 446. The 
trial court's ultimate determination of privilege is a legal question that is reviewed 
for correctness. Id. The court's underlying factual determinations are reviewed only 
13 
for clear error. Id. Because the determination of whether a privilege applies in a 
given case is necessarily fact-dependent, Defendant is obligated to marshal the 
evidence that supports the trial court's findings before she may attack its conclusion. 
See Chavez-Espmozei, 2008 UT App 191, t f 7 & 20. Defendant fails to fulfill this 
obligation here, justifying summary rejection of her argument. See id. at | 7. 
In concluding that no privilege exists under rule 506, the trial court made two 
factual findings. First, the court found that Defendant's failure to disclose to Dr. 
Jaussi her multiple narcotic prescriptions did not communicate any confidential 
information, it concealed it (R. 130) (Add. B). Second, the court found that 
Defendant's failure to provide this relevant information was not done for purposes 
of diagnosis or treatment, but to perpetrate a fraud (id.). Defendant ignores these 
findings and, without analysis or authority, summarily asserts that anything that 
transpires between a doctor and a patient is privileged. See Br.Aplt at 7-8. The 
physician-patient privilege rule is not so broad. Burns, 2006 UT 14, f 15 
(recognizing that rule 506 is not absolute, but contains exceptions within the rule 
and pursuant to section 58-37-6(9)); Anderson, 972 P.2d at 89 (same). 
Defendant's failure to marshal is compounded by her failure to properly brief. 
Defendant does not analyze the trial court's no privilege ruling and establish why it 
is wrong. She merely repeats verbatim her rejected arguments below. Compare 
BrAplt at 12-23, with R. 45-49, 96-100, 171-72 &177. Moreover, she misstates 
14 
controlling law and relies on earlier provisions no longer in force. For example, she 
argues that a former privilege statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8 (Michie Supp. 
1985), controls. See Br.Aplt at 3,7,13 & 16. See also Add. A. That provision applied 
only to civil proceedings and was superseded in 1992 by rule 506 and other 
privilege rules, which apply to both civil and crin anal proceedings. Burns, 2006 UT 
14, f 12. Defendant states an incorrect standard of review governing privilege. 
Compare Br.Aplt at 2 (citing a search and search case for a correctness standard), with 
Fox, 2007 UT App 406, Tf 13 (a privilege case applying a mixed question of law and 
fact standard). She claims, "only two reported case in the prior fifty years deal with 
the [physician-patient] privilege." Br.Aplt. at 14. In fact, there are many. See, e.g., 
Sorenson v. Barbuto, 2008 UT 8,177 P.3d 614; Burns, 2006 UT 14; State v. Cramer, 2002 
UT 9,44 P.3d 690; State v. Yount, 2008 UT App 102,182 P.3d 405; State v. Worthen, 
2008 UT App 23,177 P.3d 664; State in re T.W., 2006 UT App 259,139 P.3d 312; 
Anderson, 972 P.2d 86. She inaccurately calls this Court's holding in Anderson, 972 
P.2d at 88-89, dicta. See Br.Aplt. at 14. And she asserts that privileges must be 
construed broadly and exceptions to privilege narrowly, Br.Aplt. at 15, when the 
opposite is true. See Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, | 14-15, 173 P.3d 848 
(recognizing that "because a privilege has the undesirable effect of excluding 
relevant evidence, the term 'privileged' should be 'strictly construed in accordance 
15 
with its object7") (citations omitted). Given these marshaling and briefing failures, 
the merits of Defendant's rule 506 claim should not be considered. 
B. The trial court correctly concluded that no privilege exists under 
rule 506. 
Alternatively, if the merits are considered, the trial court correctly found and 
concluded that no privilege exists under rule 506 and, thus, Dr. Jaussi's statement is 
admissible (R. 128-31). 
Rule 506 protects from disclosure "information communicated in confidence 
[between physician and patient] for purposes of diagnosis or treatment" (Add. A). 
Applying the rule's plain language, the trial court found and concluded that 
Defendant concealed from Dr. Jaussi relevant information concerning the other 
narcotics she obtained and, therefore, her failure to disclose was not a privileged 
communication (R. 130). The ruling is supported by evidence and consistent with 
precedent. 
In Anderson, 972 P.2d at 88-89, this Court addressed nearly identical facts to 
those in this case. Anderson contemporaneously obtained multiple prescriptions for 
the same controlled substance from at least six doctors by not informing the doctors 
that he had multiple prescriptions from other sources. Id. at 87. The Court held that 
rule 506 did not protect as privileged Anderson's failure to disclose because no 
16 
information was communicated that was "necessary for relevant treatment/7 Id. at 
The purpose of the [physician-patient] privilege is to encourage the 
patient to make a full and complete disclosure to a physician in order 
to receive effective medical treatment, free from the embarrassment 
and invasion of privacy that might result from the physician's 
disclosure of the information. 
Id. But where, as in Anderson and here, information is concealed rather than 
disclosed, no privilege exists: 
Defendant's deliberate failure to disclose information regarding the 
other prescribed narcotics to the treating physicians undermines the 
very purpose of privilege^]... Although defendant asserts he is using 
the privilege to shield his privacy, he is actually attempting to 
manipulate the privilege to protect his fraud.. . The information that 
defendant withheld from the physicians was not "communicated in 
confidence and for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient," 
and therefore does not fall with the scope of the privilege. 
The Utah Supreme Court has likewise recognized that a patient cannot 
realistically expect the [physician-patient] privilege to shield evidence of fraud from 
legitimate law enforcement inquiry. Burns, 2006 UT 14, If 110 & 23 (recognizing that 
a patient is unlikely to expect that billing records are shielded from criminal 
investigation of their doctor for fraud). In the context of narcotic prescriptions, this 
is especially true given the fact that the prescriptions, including the patient's name 
and other identifying information, is maintained in a state data base that law 
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enforcement is entitled to access. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-7.5(4)-(8) (West Supp. 
2007). See also BrAplt at 17 (conceding that pharmaceutical records are not 
privileged). 
Defendant asserts that rule 506 protects from disclosure evidence of her drug 
addiction. See BrAplt at 15-16 (citing only Colorado's privilege rule in support). 
The claim, whether true or not, is irrelevant because no evidence of Defendant's 
addiction was disclosed to Dr. Jaussi; it was concealed (R. 130). 
C. The trial court correctly found the preliminary hearing sufficient 
to support the bindover. 
Intermingled with Defendant's claim that rule 506 applies, is her assertion 
that no evidence establishes that she procured the prescriptions under false 
pretenses and, consequently, that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
bindover. The contention is without merit 
The trial court found that Defendant's failure to inform Dr. Jaussi of the other 
prescriptions was fraudulent (R. 130). Defendant, on the other hand, claims the 
failure was merely negligent. BrAplt. at 21-22. According to Defendant, she had 
recently been injured and contacted Dr. Jaussi out of a "desire for treatment". 
BrAplt at 22-23. See also BrAplt at 18,21 n.4,22 n.5, App. F at 1-2 & Exh. A, App. 
KK & App. LL. The trial court rejected Defendant's unfounded assertion because no 
evidence of Defendant's injury or treatment was presented at the preliminary 
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hearing (R238:8). Instead, Defendant asserted these "facts" for the first time in her 
memoranda in support of her motion to quash. 
In any case, evidence that Defendant was legitimately seeing Dr. Jaussi could 
provide a trial defense, but would not negate the preliminary hearing evidence that 
she unlawfully obtained narcotics from the doctor by concealing her multiple other 
narcotics prescriptions. For contrary to Defendant's assertion, Br. Aplt at 22-23, an 
element of prescription fraud is not that the doctor-patient relationship is fraudulent 
at its inception, but that the administration of drugs was procured under false 
pretenses. 
It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally... to obtain 
a prescription f or . . . any controlled substance by misrepresentation or 
failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance 
from another source. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii) (Add. A). 
Defendant further argues that no negative inference of a fraudulent intent can 
be inferred from her silence. Br.Aplt at 19-22. The marshaled evidence negates this 
assertion and supports the trial court's conclusion that no privilege exists and that 
admissible evidence, including Dr. Jaussi's statement, supports bindover. For 
example, during the last two weeks of May, Defendant continually obtained 
hydrocodone prescriptions from Dr. Bedell (R. 58). The first week of June, she 
obtained more hydrocodone from Dr. Jaussi (R. 58,121; R281.18). Two weeks later, 
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she obtained 135 tablets of hydrocodone from Dr. Bedell (R. 112). Four days later, 
she obtained Endocet, a form of oxycodone, from Dr. Jaussi (R. 112; R281:18). As 
Detective Italasano testified, Defendant's pattern in obtaining these drugs indicates 
fraud (R281: 7). Moreover, during the four months Defendant obtained narcotics 
prescriptions from Dr. Jaussi, she continued to obtain the same narcotics from other 
sources, but never communicated this to Dr. Jaussi. See Statement of Facts, supra, at 7-
8. This evidence establishes probable cause that Defendant unlawfully shopped 
doctors for drugs. 
In sum, the trial court correctly concluded that no privilege exists under rule 
506, correctly found the evidence sufficient to support bindover, and properly 
denied the motion to quash. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT NO 
PRIVILEGE ATTACHED UNDER SECTION 58-37-6(9) AND, 
THEREFORE, THE DOCTOR'S STATEMENT WAS 
ADMISSIBLE 
The trial court alternatively and correctly concluded that section 58-37-6(9), 
the drug-fraud exception, precluded privilege because Defendant's failure to 
disclose was done to unlawfully procure narcotics (R. 128-31) (Add. A & B). 
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A. The trial court correctly found that Defendant's failure to disclose 
was done to unlawfully procure drugs and, therefore, was not a 
privileged communication under the drug-fraud exception. 
In concluding that no privilege existed under rule 506, the trial court correctly 
foxmd that Defendant's failure to disclose was not done for purposes of diagnosis or 
treatment, but was fraudulent (R. 130). See Point I, supra. For the same reasons, the 
court correctly foxmd that the failxire to disclose was done to xinlawfxilly procxire the 
administration of narcotics and, therefore, was not a privileged commxinication 
pursuant to the drug-fraud exception in section 58-37-6(9) (R. 130) {Add. B). 
As discussed in Point I, Defendant has not marshaled the evidence to support 
this finding and, consequently, her section 58-37-6(9) argument may be summarily 
rejected. Even if the merits are considered, the preliminary hearing evidence 
supports Defendant's intent to unlawfully procxire narcotics. The trial coxirt, 
therefore, properly denied the motion to quash. 
B. No constitutional issue is involved in this case. 
Defendant, nevertheless, claims that the trial coxirt erred in its conclusion that 
section 58-37-6(9) precludes privilege. She asserts that the separation of powers 
clause, art. V, § 1 of the state constitution, prohibits any legislative amendment of a 
judicially adopted evidentiary rule, even though article VIII, § 4 grants such 
authority to the legislature. Br.Aplt. at 8-9. See fn. 7 for text of provisions & Add. A. 
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Accordingly, Defendant argues that section 58-37-6(9) impermissibly "amends" rule 
506 and is void. Br.Aplt. at 6-8. 
Defendant's argument is premised on the faulty assumption that all statutory 
evidentiary provisions require a two-thirds vote of the legislature to be valid. See 
Br.Aplt. at 12. While this may be true regarding a newly created evidentiary statute 
that amends an existing evidentiary rule, a two-thirds vote is not required for 
"existing statutory provisions not in conflict" with current privilege rules. See Utah 
Const, art. VIII, § 1; Utah R. Evid. 501. 
Contrary to Defendant's assumption, section 58-37-6(9) is not new legislation 
that amends an existing rule. The drug-fraud exception pre-existed rule 506 by 
fifteen years.9 When rule 506 and the other privilege rules were adopted in 1992, it 
was expressly recognized that existing privilege statutes would remain in full force 
and effect: 
Except as provided in the Constitutions of the United States and 
the State of Utah, no person shall have a privilege to withhold evidence 
except as provided by these or other rules adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court or by existing statutory -provisions not in conflict with them. 
Utah R. Evid. 501 (emphasis added) {Add. A). In the Advisory Committee Note to 
rule 501, the committee emphasized, "Rule 501 also accepts all pre-existing statutory 
9
 Section 58-37-6(9) was previously numbered section 58-37-6(8) and has had 
linguistic modifications since first enacted in 1977. Its substance, however, has not 
changed. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-6(9) (West 2004), with Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-6(8) (Mitchie Supp. 1985) {Add. A). 
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privileges, except those inconsistent with these rules/' See id. See also Burns, 2006 
UT 14, f 18 n.6 (recognizing that "advisory committee notes to the Utah Rules of 
Evidence merit great weight in any interpretation of those rules"). The committee 
noted that the new privilege rules, which applied to both criminal and civil 
proceedings, rendered "ineffective" section 78-24-8, the former privilege statute that 
applied only to civil proceedings. See Utah R. Evid. 501, Advisory Note (Add. A). 
See also Burns, 2006 UT 14, \ 12. At the same time, the committee recognized a non-
exhaustive laundry list of existing privilege statutes that potentially survived the 
new privilege rules. See Utah R. Evid. 501, Advisory Committee Note. 
The Advisory Committee Note to rule 501 did not identify section 58-37-6(9) 
as a superseded provision or as a potentially surviving statute. Nevertheless, this 
Court subsequently recognized that the drug-fraud exception and rule 506 share the 
same purpose and, consequently, do not conflict. Anderson, 972 P.2d at 89. Section 
58-37-6(9) merely makes explicit what is implicit in the rule: a criminal defendant 
may not "manipulate the privilege to protect his fraud/' Id. Accord Burns, 2006 UT 
14, Tf 10 (recognizing that "the purpose of the privilege is to promote full disclosure 
within the physician-patient relationship and thereby facilitate more effective 
treatment"). Anderson's assessment of section 58-37-6(9) is further buttressed by 
precedent that recognizes that a statutory evidentiary exception does not conflict 
with an evidentiary rule that otherwise contains exceptions. See State v. Lougton, 747 
23 
P.2d 426, 431-32 (Utah 1987) (recognizing that a statute hearsay exception "is 
consistent with other numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule. . . [and] is therefore 
not superseded by the Utah Rules of Evidence"); Lay ton City v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965, 
967-68 (Utah App. 1987) (same in context of another hearsay statute). In sum, there 
is no constitutional issue to resolve because rule 506 and section 58-37-6(9) do not 
conflict.10 
Alternatively, even if section 58-37-6(9) conflicted with rule 506, the statutory 
exception would still be valid. Article VIII, § 4 permits legislative amendment of an 
existing evidentiary rule by a two-thirds vote. Though not required at the time, 
section 58-37-6(9) was originally enacted by a two-thirds vote in 1977. See S.B. No. 
153,42d Legis., Gen. Sess., H. Journal vol. 2 at 1194 (1977); S.B. No. 153,42d Legis., 
Gen. Sess., S. Journal vol. 1 at 579 (s1977). Following adoption of article VUI, § 4 in 
1984, the drug-fraud exception was re-enacted by a two-thirds vote in 1987. See S.B. 
No. 35,47th Legis. Gen. Sess., H. Journal at 850 (1987); S.B. No. 35,47th Legis. Gen. 
Sess., S. Journal at 481 (1987). And after adoption of rule 506 in 1992, the drug-fraud 
Moreover, apart from the merits, Defendant's failure to acknowledge rule 
501 or Anderson's holding justify summary rejection of her section 58-37-6(9) 
argument. See Br.Aplt. at 14. See also Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, f 7. 
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exception was again re-enacted by a two-thirds vote in 1997.11 See H.B. No. 21,52d 
Legis. Gen. Sess., H. Journal at 315-16 (1997); H.B. No. 21,52d Legis. Gen. Sess., S. 
Journal at 488-89 (1997). 
Defendant's argument that that the separation of powers doctrine requires 
something more than compliance with art VTII, § 4, is not adequately briefed and 
should be summarily rejected. See Br.Aplt. at 7-12 (claiming without authority that 
traditional separation of powers analysis does not apply and implying without 
analysis that art. VIIL, § 4 is unconstitutional). See also West Jordan City v. Goodwin, 
2006 UT 27, %% 29-30 135 P.3d 874 (recognizing that an adequate brief must go 
"beyond providing conclusory statements and 'fully identify, analyze, and cite its 
legal arguments"). Consequently, even if it was necessary to resolve the 
constitutional issue—which it is not—Defendant's argument fails under traditional 
separation of powers analysis. See Jones v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 2004 UT 53, m 10 & 
11
 In ruling, the trial court did not discuss the 1987 or 1997 re-enactments, but 
relied on a two-thirds vote in 2002 (R. 128-30). It appears that the 2002 vote was on a 
different subsection of the statute, and not subsection 6(9). 
25 
23, 94 R3d 283.12 Article VIII, § 4 constitutionally bestows primary rule-making 
authority on the supreme court and confers rule-making authority on the legislature 
upon condition of a two-thirds vote. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted July ^ D , 2008. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
12
 Under Jones, 2004 UT 53, f 10, this Court "presumes" the constitutionality 
of the challenged provision and resolves "[e]very reasonable doubt . . . in favor of 
constitutionality" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, in 
determining whether there is a separation of powers challenge, three questions are 
posed: "First, are the [actors] in question 'charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to' one of the three branches of government? Second, is the 
function that the statute has given the [actors] one 'appertaining to' another branch 
of government? The third and final step in the analysis asks: if the answer to both of 
the above questions is 'yes/ does the constitution 'expressly' direct or permit 
exercise of the otherwise forbidden function? If not, article V, section 1 is 
transgressed." Id. at f^ 23 (citation and other internal quotation marks omitted). 
Under this analysis, article V, § 1, is not violated simply because two branches 
harmoniously cooperate and share some functions. Id. at f 29. 
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*g Article V. Privileges 
^RULE 501. PRIVILEGES RECOGNIZED 
Except as provided in the Constitutions of the United States and the State of 
Utah, no person shall have a privilege to withhold evidence except as provided by 
these or other rules adopted by the Utah Supreme Court or by existing statutory 
provisions not in conflict with them. 
[Amended effective April 15, 1992.] 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
It is in the nature of evidentiary privileges that they interfere with establish-
ment of the whole truth. As a consequence, some members of the Committee thought 
that all statutory privileges not important enough to be incorporated in Article V 
should be expressly invalidated. Most members, however, felt that in spite of the 
truth-impeding effect of privileges, the already-existing legislatively created 
privileges should be preserved. Members of the majority expressed various views: 
(1) Privileges reflect good policy choices, fostering candor in important rela-
tionships by promising protection of confidential disclosures. 
(2) Even if the statutory privileges are not all wise, the legislature has by 
democratic process resolved policy disputes and should not be lightly overturned. 
Under the Utah Constitution, art. VIII, § 4, while the Supreme Court has the basic 
power to establish rules of privilege, the legislature also has a role, since it 
is empowered to make amendments by a two-thirds vote of all members of both houses 
of the legislature. Even the Committee members who would abolish statutory priv-
ileges recognized the dismaying magnitude of the task of reevaluating every exist-
ing privilege separately. 
(3) The statutory privileges most often invoked are the traditional ones dealt 
with in other sections of Article V. The other statutory privileges are relied on 
rarely, if at all, so that their perpetuation will have almost no impact on court 
proceedings. If problems involving these more exotic privileges do arise, that is 
the time for the Court to deal with them. 
Rule 501 acknowledges the existence of other privileges created by federal and 
state constitutions, such as the exclusion of the fruits of unreasonable searches 
and seizures, of coerced confessions, and of compulsory self-incrimination. 
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Rule 501 also accepts all pre-existing statutory privileges, except those incon-
sistent with these rules. In particular, Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8, insofar as it 
defines privileges relating to spouses, attorneys, clergy, and physicians, § 
58-25a-8, with respect to psychologists, and § 58-35-10, with respect to social 
workers, are made ineffectual by the adoption of rules specifically redefining 
those privileges. 
The Supreme Court has the power to create rules of privilege formally. It can 
also create or reshape privileges by its decisions in concrete cases. However, 
the language of 501, that there are no non-rule, non-statutory privileges, serves 
as a declaration by the Court that it intends to operate normally through formal 
rule-making procedures. 
The Committee made an effort to identify all the statutes in effect in 1989 that 
specifically provided for a privilege. Other than privileges dealt with in other 
rules, they are listed below. Statutes that merely imply the existence of a priv-
ilege are also included, marked by asterisks. Even though the Committee's own 
search was augmented by Judge Michael L. Hutchings' article "Privileges in Utah 
Law," Utah Bar Journal 2:3:34 (Mar. 1989), there may be still other such provi-
sions. 
Witnesses. 
§ 78-24-9 (witness need not answer degrading question unless it is closely related 
to a fact in issue or is conviction of a felony); 
Grand jury. 
§ 77-10a-13 (grand juror may not disclose how any juror voted, though grand juror 
can be compelled to disclose what jurors said); 
Interpreter. 
§ 78-24a-10 (information communicated through an interpreter for the hearing-im-
paired that is otherwise privileged); 
Health care data. 
§ 26-3-9 (health care data collected by Department of Health); 
§§ 26-25a-101 and -102 (communicable disease data collected by health departments) 
(cf. § 26-6-20.5); 
§ 26-25-3 (medical information gathered for medical research); 
§ 76-7-313 (information on abortions); 
§ 31A-22-617 (4) (c) (health care data audited by Department of Health); 
® 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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§§ 2 6 - 6 a - 6 * and - 7 * ( t e s t f o r AIDS); 
§ 5 8-17-16* (pharmacy may not release patient's medical profile except to drug law 
enforcement or at patient's direction; the implication is that it may not be ob-
tained in civil litigation); 
Professionals working with social or psychological problems. 
§ 58-41-16 (speech pathologist); 
§ 30-1-37 (marriage counselor); 
§ 58-39-10 (marriage counselor); 
§ 30-3-17.1* (communications to court-appointed domestic relations counselors 
working toward marital reconciliation; subject to "public interests" under § 
78-24-8(5)); 
§ 78-24-8 (sexual assault counselor); 
§ 78-3C-4 (sexual assault counselor); 
§ 53A-24-107 (individual information of persons being rehabilitated, except in en-
forcement of law); 
Results of private investigations. 
§ 58-12-43(7) (information collected by professional committee investigating a 
doctor); 
§ 78-14-15 (evidence presented to medical malpractice panel); 
§ 34-38-13 (results of employer tests for drugs or alcohol); 
§ 78-27-49 (no private financial information obtained from a bank without court 
order "shall be admissible"); 
Government information. 
§ 78-24-8 (communications to public officers in official confidence); 
§ 35-9-14* (trade secrets communicated to Industrial Commission can be used only 
in enforcement of Occupational Safety and Health Act and then under protective or-
der) ; 
§ 78-7-30(3)* (information in proceedings before Judicial Conduct Commission "are 
privileged in any civil action," except where subpoenaed in case challenging judi-
cial conduct as improper or except when judge does not resign within 6 months); 
§ 76-8-708 (college administrator "cannot be examined" as to information obtained 
c
 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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by procedures for enforcing school rules); 
§§ 63-2-201 and 63-2-202* (confidential information in state archives); 
§ 41-2-201* (information provided by doctor or expert in physical, mental or emo-
tional disabilities in determining whether to issue a restricted driver's license 
to an "impaired" person is "confidential"); 
§ 41-6-40 (compulsory automobile accident reports); 
§ 54-4-16 (accident reports filed by public utility with Public Service Commis-
sion) ; 
§ 41-6-170 (traffic convictions); 
§ 77-18-2(4) and (5) (records of expungement of conviction); 
§ 77-27-21.5(12)* (sex offender registration); 
§ 77-18-1(4) (presentence report); 
§ 78-24-10 (compelled testimony about fraudulent conveyances); 
§ 63-53a-6 (information collected by governor concerning state energy resources); 
§ 73-22-6* (logs of geothermal wells); 
§ 40-8-8* (confidential information communicated to Board of Oil, Gas and Mining 
"shall be protected and not become public records" unless waived or mining opera-
tion terminates); 
§ 7-1-802* (reports to Commissioner of Financial Institutions); 
§ 70C-8-103(5)* (identity of persons investigated by Department of Financial In-
stitutions but not subject of enforcement proceedings); 
§ 13-11-7(2)* (identity of persons investigated for consumer sales fraud but not 
subject to enforcement proceedings). 
In addition to statutes which directly or indirectly create evidentiary priv-
ileges, there are a great many statutes which seem to impose a professional or in-
stitutional obligation of keeping confidence, yet do not clearly exempt the in-
formation from subpoena. A great many of the provisions cited by Hutchings are of 
this sort. A few examples are: 
§ 78-3e-2 (identity of persons informing about drugs in schools, "shall be kept 
confidential"); 
§ 26-4-17 (autopsy report is "confidential," though it can be released to police, 
® 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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relatives, or attending physician); 
§ 65A-1-10 (proprietary geologic or financial information communicated to Division 
of State Lands and Forestry; the board "may" keep it confidential). 
® 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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*[§ Article V. Privileges 
_>RULE 506. PHYSICIAN AND MENTAL HEALTH THERAPIST-PATIENT 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) "Patient" means a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a 
physician or mental health therapist. 
(2) "Physician" means a person licensed, or reasonably believed by the patient 
to be licensed, to practice medicine in any state. 
(3) "Mental health therapist" means a person who is or is reasonably believed by 
the patient to be licensed or certified in any state as a physician, psycholo-
gist, clinical or certified social worker, marriage and family therapist, ad-
vanced practice registered nurse designated as a registered psychiatric mental 
health nurse specialist, or professional counselor while that person is engaged 
in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including al-
cohol or drug addiction. 
(b) General Rule of Privilege. If the information is communicated in confidence 
and for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a priv-
ilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other 
person from disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by 
a physician or mental health therapist, (2) information obtained by examination of 
the patient, and (3) information transmitted among a patient, a physician or men-
tal health therapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treat-
ment under the direction of the physician or mental health therapist, including 
guardians or members of the patient's family who are present to further the in-
terest of the patient because they are reasonably necessary for the transmission 
of the communications, or participation in the diagnosis and treatment under the 
direction of the physician or mental health therapist. 
(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the patient, or 
the guardian or conservator of the patient. The person who was the physician or 
mental health therapist at the time of the communication is presumed to have au-
thority during the life of the patient to claim the privilege on behalf of the pa-
tient. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
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(1) Condition as Element of Claim or Defense. As to a communication relevant to 
an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any 
proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim or defense, or, 
after the patient's death, in any proceedings in which any party relies upon the 
condition as an element of the claim or defense; 
(2) Hospitalization for Mental Illness. For communications relevant to an issue 
in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the mental 
health therapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that the 
patient is in need of hospitalization; 
(3) Court Ordered Examination. For communications made in the course of, and 
pertinent to the purpose of, a court-ordered examination of the physical, men-
tal, or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party or witness, unless the 
court in ordering the examination specifies otherwise. 
[Amended effective July 1, 1994.] 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Rule 506 is modeled after Rule 503 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, and is inten-
ded to supersede Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-24-8(4) and 58-25a-8. There is no corres-
ponding federal rule. By virtue of Rule 5 01, marriage and family therapists are 
not covered by this Rule. 
The differences between existing § 78-24-8 and Rule 506 are as follows: 
(1) Rule 506 specifically applies to psychotherapists and licensed psychologists, 
it being the opinion of the Committee that full disclosure of information by a pa-
tient in those settings is as critical as and as much to be encouraged as in the 
"physician" patient setting. The Utah Supreme Court requested that Rule 506 fur-
ther apply to licensed clinical social workers. To meet this request, the Commit-
tee included such individuals within the definition of psychotherapists. Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-35-2(5), the practice of clinical social work "means the ap-
plication of an established body of knowledge and professional skills in the prac-
tice of psychotherapy. ..." Section 58-35-6 provides that "[n]o person may engage 
in the practice of clinical social work unless that person: (1) is licensed under 
this chapter as a certified social worker," has the requisite experience, and has 
passed an examination. Section 58-35-8(4) refers to licenses and certificates for 
"clinical social worker[s]." As a result of including clinical social workers, 
Rule 506 is intended to supplant Utah Code Ann. § 58-35-10 in total for all social 
workers. 
(2) Rule 506 applies to both civil and criminal cases, whereas § 78-24-8 applies 
only to civil cases. The Committee was of the opinion that the considerations 
supporting the privilege apply in both. 
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(3) In the Committee's original recommendation to the Utah Supreme Court, 
the proposed Rule 506 granted protection only to confidential communications, but 
did not extend the privilege to observations made, diagnosis or treatment by the 
physician/psychotherapist. The Committee was of the opinion that while the tradi-
tional protection of the privilege should extend to confidential communications, 
as is the case in other traditional privileges, the interests of society in dis-
covering the truth during the trial process outweigh any countervailing interests 
in extending the protection to observations made, diagnosis or treatment. 
However, the Supreme Court requested that the scope of the privilege be broadened 
to include information obtained by the physician or psychotherapist in the course 
of diagnosis or treatment, whether obtained verbally from the patient or through 
the physician's or psychotherapist's observation or examination of the patient. 
The Court further requested that the privilege extend to diagnosis, treatment, and 
advice. To meet these requests, the Committee relied in part on language from the 
California evidentiary privileges involving physicians and psychotherapists. See 
Cal.Evid.Code §§ 992 and 1012. These features of the rule appear in subparagraphs 
(a)(4) and (b). The Committee also relied on language from Uniform Rule of Evid-
ence 503. 
Upon the death of the patient, the privilege ceases to exist. 
The privilege extends to communications to the physician or psychotherapist from 
other persons who are acting in the interest of the patient, such as family mem-
bers or others who may be consulted for information needed to help the patient. 
The privilege includes those who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment 
under the direction of the physician or psychotherapist. For example, a certified 
social worker practicing under the supervision of a clinical social worker would 
be included. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-35-6. 
The patient is entitled not only to refuse to disclose the confidential communica-
tion, but also to prevent disclosure by the physician or psychotherapist or others 
who were properly involved or others who overheard, without the knowledge of the 
patient, the confidential communication. Problems of waiver are dealt with by 
Rule 507. 
The Committee felt that exceptions to the privilege should be specifically enumer-
ated, and further endorsed the concept that in the area of exceptions, the rule 
should simply state that no privilege existed, rather than expressing the excep-
tion in terms of a "waiver" of the privilege. The Committee wanted to avoid any 
possible clashes with the common law concepts of "waiver." 
The Committee did not intend this rule to limit or conflict with the health care 
data statutes listed in the Committee Note to Rule 501. 
Rule 506 is not intended to override the child abuse reporting requirements con-
tained in Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4-501 et seq. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 506 
The 1994 amendment to Rule 506 was primarily in response to legislation enacted 
during the 1994 Legislative General Session that changed the licensure require-
ments for certain mental health professionals. The rule now covers communications 
with additional licensed professionals who are engaged in treatment and diagnosis 
of mental or emotional conditions, specifically certified social workers, marriage 
and family therapists, specially designated advanced practice registered nurses 
and professional counselors. 
Some mental health therapists use the term "client" rather than "patient," but for 
simplicity this rule uses only "patient." 
The committee also combined the definition of confidential communication and the 
general rule section, but no particular substantive change was intended by the re-
organization. 
Westlaw* 
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-6 (2004) 
c 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 58. OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
CHAPTER 37. UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 
„+§ 58-37-6. License to manufacture, produce, distribute, dispense, adminis-
ter, or conduct research--Issuance by division--Denial, suspension, or revoc-
ation- -Records required--Prescriptions 
(1)(a) The division may adopt rules relating to the licensing and control of the 
manufacture, distribution, production, prescription, administration, dispensing, 
conducting of research with, and performing of laboratory analysis upon controlled 
substances within this state. 
(b) The division may assess reasonable fees to defray the cost of issuing ori-
ginal and renewal licenses under this chapter pursuant to Section 63J-1-303. 
(2)(a)(i) Every person who manufactures, produces, distributes, prescribes, dis-
penses, administers, conducts research with, or performs laboratory analysis upon 
any controlled substance in Schedules II through V within this state, or who pro-
poses to engage in manufacturing, producing, distributing, prescribing, dispens-
ing, administering, conducting research with, or performing laboratory analysis 
upon controlled substances included in Schedules II through V within this state 
shall obtain a license issued by the division. 
(ii) The division shall issue each license under this chapter in accordance 
with a two-year renewal cycle established by rule. The division may by rule ex-
tend or shorten a renewal period by as much as one year to stagger the renewal 
cycles it administers. 
(b) Persons licensed to manufacture, produce, distribute, prescribe, dispense, 
administer, conduct research with, or perform laboratory analysis upon con-
trolled substances in Schedules II through V within this state may possess, man-
ufacture, produce, distribute, prescribe, dispense, administer, conduct research 
with, or perform laboratory analysis upon those substances to the extent author-
ized by their license and in conformity with this chapter. 
(c) The following persons are not required to obtain a license and may lawfully 
possess controlled substances under this section: 
(i) an agent or employee, except a sales representative, of any registered man-
ufacturer, distributor, or dispenser of any controlled substance, if the agent 
or employee is acting in the usual course of the person's business or employ-
ment; however, nothing in this subsection shall be interpreted to permit an 
agent, employee, sales representative, or detail man to maintain an inventory 
of controlled substances separate from the location of the person's employer's 
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registered and licensed place of business; 
(ii) a motor carrier or warehouseman, or an employee of. a motor carrier or 
warehouseman, who possesses any controlled substance in the usual course of the 
person's business or employment; and 
(iii) an ultimate user, or any person who possesses any controlled substance 
pursuant to a lawful order of a practitioner. 
(d) The division may enact rules waiving the license requirement for certain 
manufacturers, producers, distributors, prescribers, dispensers, administrators, 
research practitioners, or laboratories performing analysis if consistent with 
the public health and safety. 
(e) A separate license is required at each principal place of business or pro-
fessional practice where the applicant manufactures, produces, distributes, dis-
penses, conducts research with, or performs laboratory analysis upon controlled 
substances. 
(f) The division may enact rules providing for the inspection of a licensee or 
applicant's establishment, and may inspect the establishment according to those 
rules. 
(3)(a) Upon proper application, the division shall license a qualified applicant 
to manufacture, produce, distribute, conduct research with, or perform laboratory 
analysis upon controlled substances included in Schedules I through V, unless it 
determines that issuance of a license is inconsistent with the public interest. 
The division shall not issue a license to any person to prescribe, dispense, or 
administer a Schedule I controlled substance. In determining public interest, the 
division shall consider whether or not the applicant has: 
(i) maintained effective controls against diversion of controlled substances 
and any Schedule I or II substance compounded from any controlled substance in-
to other than legitimate medical, scientific, or industrial channels; 
(ii) complied with applicable state and local law; 
(iii) been convicted under federal or state laws relating to the manufacture, 
distribution, or dispensing of substances; 
(iv) past experience in the manufacture of controlled dangerous substances; 
(v) established effective controls against diversion; and 
(vi) complied with any other factors that the division establishes that promote 
the public health and safety. 
(b) Licenses granted under Subsection (3)(a) do not entitle a licensee to manu-
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facture, produce, distribute, conduct research with, or perform laboratory ana-
lysis upon controlled substances in Schedule I other than those specified in the 
license. 
(c)(i) Practitioners shall be licensed to administer, dispense, or conduct re-
search with substances in Schedules II through V if they are authorized to ad-
minister, dispense, or conduct research under the laws of this state. 
(ii) The division need not require a separate license for practitioners enga-
ging in research with nonnarcotic controlled substances in Schedules II through 
V where the licensee is already licensed under this act in another capacity. 
(iii) With respect to research involving narcotic substances in Schedules II 
through V, or where the division by rule requires a separate license for re-
search of nonnarcotic substances in Schedules II through V, a practitioner 
shall apply to the division prior to conducting research. 
(iv) Licensing for purposes of bona fide research with controlled substances by 
a practitioner considered qualified may be denied only on a ground specified in 
Subsection (4), or upon evidence that the applicant will abuse or unlawfully 
transfer or fail to safeguard adequately the practitioner's supply of sub-
stances against diversion from medical or scientific use. 
(v) Practitioners registered under federal law to conduct research in Schedule 
I substances may conduct research in Schedule I substances within this state 
upon furnishing the division evidence of federal registration. 
(d) Compliance by manufacturers, producers, and distributors with the provisions 
of federal law respecting registration, excluding fees, entitles them to be li-
censed under this chapter. 
(e) The division shall initially license those persons who own or operate an es-
tablishment engaged in the manufacture, production, distribution, dispensation, 
or administration of controlled substances prior to April 3, 1980, and who are 
licensed by the state. 
(4)(a) Any license pursuant to Subsection (2) or (3) may be denied, suspended, 
placed on probation, or revoked by the division upon finding that the applicant or 
licensee has: 
(i) materially falsified any application filed or required pursuant to this 
chapter; 
(ii) been convicted of an offense under this chapter or any law of the United 
States, or any state, relating to any substance defined as a controlled sub-
stance; 
(iii) been convicted of a felony under any other law of the United States or 
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any state within five years of the date of the issuance of the license; 
(iv) had a federal license denied, suspended, or revoked by competent federal 
authority and is no longer authorized to engage in the manufacturing, distribu-
tion, or dispensing of controlled substances; 
(v) had the licenseefs license suspended or revoked by competent authority of 
another state for violation of laws or regulations comparable to those of this 
state relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled 
substances; 
(vi) violated any division rule that reflects adversely on the licensee!s reli-
ability and integrity with respect to controlled substances; 
(vii) refused inspection of records required to be maintained under this 
chapter by a person authorized to inspect them; or 
(viii) prescribed, dispensed, administered, or injected an anabolic steroid for 
the purpose of manipulating human hormonal structure so as to: 
(A) increase muscle mass, strength, or weight without medical necessity and 
without a written prescription by any practitioner in the course of the prac-
titioner's professional practice; or 
(B) improve performance in any form of human exercise, sport, or game. 
(b) The division may limit revocation or suspension of a license to a particular 
controlled substance with respect to which grounds for revocation or suspension 
exist. 
(c)(i) Proceedings to deny, revoke, or suspend a license shall be conducted pur-
suant to this section and in accordance with the procedures set forth in Title 
58, Chapter 1, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, and con-
ducted in conjunction with the appropriate representative committee designated 
by the director of the department. 
(ii) Nothing in this Subsection (4)(c) gives the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing exclusive authority in proceedings to deny, revoke, or 
suspend licenses, except where the division is designated by law to perform 
those functions, or, when not designated by law, is designated by the executive 
director of the Department of Commerce to conduct the proceedings. 
(d)(i) The division may suspend any license simultaneously with the institution 
of proceedings under this section if it finds there is an imminent danger to the 
public health or safety. 
(ii) Suspension shall continue in effect until the conclusion of proceedings, 
including judicial review, unless withdrawn by the division or dissolved by a 
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court of competent jurisdiction. 
(e)(i) If a license is suspended or revoked under this Subsection (4), all con-
trolled substances owned or possessed by the licensee may be placed under seal 
in the discretion of the division. 
(ii) Disposition may not be made of substances under seal until the time for 
taking an appeal has lapsed, or until all appeals have been concluded, unless a 
court, upon application, orders the sale of perishable substances and the pro-
ceeds deposited with the court. 
(iii) If a revocation order becomes final, all controlled substances shall be 
forfeited. 
(f) The division shall notify promptly the Drug Enforcement Administration of 
all orders suspending or revoking a license and all forfeitures of controlled 
substances. 
(5) (a) Persons licensed under Subsection (2) or (3) shall maintain records and in-
ventories in conformance with the record keeping and inventory requirements of 
federal and state law and any additional rules issued by the division. 
(b) (i) Every physician, dentist, veterinarian, practitioner, or other person who 
is authorized to administer or professionally use a controlled substance shall 
keep a record of the drugs received by him and a record of all drugs admin-
istered, dispensed, or professionally used by him otherwise than by a prescrip-
tion. 
(ii) A person using small quantities or solutions or other preparations of 
those drugs for local application has complied with this Subsection (5)(b) if 
the person keeps a record of the quantity, character, and potency of those 
solutions or preparations purchased or prepared by him, and of the dates when 
purchased or prepared. 
(6) Controlled substances in Schedules I through V may be distributed only by a 
licensee and pursuant to an order form prepared in compliance with division rules 
or a lawful order under the rules and regulations of the United States. 
(7)(a) A person may not write or authorize a prescription for a controlled sub-
stance unless the person is: 
(i) a practitioner authorized to prescribe drugs and medicine under the laws of 
this state or under the laws of another state having similar standards; and 
(ii) licensed under this chapter or under the laws of another state having sim-
ilar standards. 
(b) A person other than a pharmacist licensed under the laws of this state, or 
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the pharmacist's licensed intern, as required by Sections 58-17b-303 and 
58-17b-304, may not dispense a controlled substance. 
(c)(i) A controlled substance may not be dispensed without the written prescrip-
tion of a practitioner, if the written prescription is required by the federal 
Controlled Substances Act. 
(ii) That written prescription shall be made in accordance with Subsection 
(7)(a) and in conformity with Subsection (7)(d). 
(iii) In emergency situations, as defined by division rule, controlled sub-
stances may be dispensed upon oral prescription of a practitioner, if reduced 
promptly to writing on forms designated by the division and filed by the phar-
macy. 
(iv) Prescriptions reduced to writing by a pharmacist shall be in conformity 
with Subsection (7)(d). 
(d) Except for emergency situations designated by the division, a person may not 
issue, fill, compound, or dispense a prescription for a controlled substance un-
less the prescription is signed by the prescriber in ink or indelible pencil or 
is signed with an electronic signature of the prescriber as authorized by divi-
sion rule, and contains the following information: 
(i) the name, address, and registry number of the prescriber; 
(ii) the name, address, and age of the person to whom or for whom the prescrip-
tion is issued; 
(iii) the date of issuance of the prescription; and 
(iv) the name, quantity, and specific directions for use by the ultimate user 
of the controlled substance. 
(e) A prescription may not be written, issued, filled, or dispensed for a Sched-
ule I controlled substance. 
(f) Except when administered directly to an ultimate user by a licensed practi-
tioner, controlled substances are subject to the following restrictions: 
(i)(A) A prescription for a Schedule II substance may not be refilled. 
(B) A Schedule II controlled substance may not be filled in a quantity to ex-
ceed a one-month's supply, as directed on the daily dosage rate of the pre-
scriptions. 
(ii) A Schedule III or IV controlled substance may be filled only within six 
months of issuance, and may not be refilled more than six months after the date 
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of its original issuance or be refilled more than five times after the date of 
the prescription unless renewed by the practitioner. 
(iii) All other controlled substances in Schedule V may be refilled as the pre-
server's prescription directs, but they may not be refilled one year after the 
date the prescription was issued unless renewed by the practitioner. 
(iv) Any prescription for a Schedule II substance may not be dispensed if it is 
not presented to a pharmacist for dispensing by a pharmacist or a pharmacy in-
tern within 3 0 days after the date the prescription was issued, or 30 days 
after the dispensing date, if that date is specified separately from the date 
of issue. 
(v) A practitioner may issue more than one prescription at the same time for 
the same Schedule II controlled substance, but only under the following condi-
tions : 
(A) no more than three prescriptions for the same Schedule II controlled sub-
stance may be issued at the same time; 
(B) no one prescription may exceed a 3 0-day supply; 
(C) a second or third prescription shall include the date of issuance and the 
date for dispensing; and 
(D) unless the practitioner determines there is a valid medical reason to the 
contrary, the date for dispensing a second or third prescription may not be 
fewer than 30 days from the dispensing date of the previous prescription. 
(vi) Each prescription for a controlled substance may contain only one con-
trolled substance per prescription form and may not contain any other legend 
drug or prescription item. 
(g) An order for a controlled substance in Schedules II through V for use by an 
inpatient or an outpatient of a licensed hospital is exempt from all require-
ments of this Subsection (7) if the order is: 
(i) issued or made by a prescribing practitioner who holds an unrestricted re-
gistration with the federal Drug Enforcement Administration, and an active Utah 
controlled substance license in good standing issued by the division under this 
section, or a medical resident who is exempted from licensure under Subsection 
58-1-307(1)(c); 
(ii) authorized by the prescribing practitioner treating the patient and the 
prescribing practitioner designates the quantity ordered; 
(iii) entered upon the record of the patient, the record is signed by the pre-
scriber affirming the prescriber's authorization of the order within 48 hours 
2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
U.C.A. 1953 §58-37-6 
after filling or administering the order, and the patient's record reflects the 
quantity actually administered; and 
(iv) filled and dispensed by a pharmacist practicing the pharmacist's profes-
sion within the physical structure of the hospital, or the order is taken from 
a supply lawfully maintained by the hospital and the amount taken from the sup-
ply is administered directly to the patient authorized to receive it. 
(h) A practitioner licensed under this chapter may not prescribe, administer, or 
dispense a controlled substance to a child, without first obtaining the consent 
required in Section 78B-3-406 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco 
parentis of the child except in cases of an emergency. For purposes of this Sub-
section (7) (h), "child" has the same meaning as defined in Section 78A-6-105, 
and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring the administration of a 
controlled substance for immediate relief of pain or suffering. 
(i) A practitioner licensed under this chapter may not prescribe or administer 
dosages of a controlled substance in excess of medically recognized quantities 
necessary to treat the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user. 
(j) A practitioner licensed under this chapter may not prescribe, administer, or 
dispense any controlled substance to another person knowing that the other per-
son is using a false name, address, or other personal information for the pur-
pose of securing the controlled substance. 
(k) A person who is licensed under this chapter to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense a controlled substance may not manufacture, distribute, or dispense a 
controlled substance to another licensee or any other authorized person not au-
thorized by this license. 
(1) A person licensed under this chapter may not omit, remove, alter, or oblit-
erate a symbol required by this chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter. 
(m) A person licensed under this chapter may not refuse or fail to make, keep, 
or furnish any record notification, order form, statement, invoice, or informa-
tion required under this chapter. 
(n) A person licensed under this chapter may not refuse entry into any premises 
for inspection as authorized by this chapter. 
(o) A person licensed under this chapter may not furnish false or fraudulent ma-
terial information in any application, report, or other document required to be 
kept by this chapter or willfully make any false statement in any prescription, 
order, report, or record required by this chapter. 
(8)(a)(i) Any person licensed under this chapter who is found by the division to 
have violated any of the provisions of Subsections (7)(k) through (7)(o) is sub-
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ject to a penalty not to exceed $5,000. The division shall determine the procedure 
for adjudication of any violations in accordance with Sections 58- 1-106 and 
58-1-108. 
(ii) The division shall deposit all penalties collected under Subsection 
(8)(a)(i) in the General Fund as a dedicated credit to be used by the division 
under Subsection 58-37-7.7(1). 
(b) Any person who knowingly and intentionally violates Subsections (7)(h) 
through (7)(j) is: 
(i) upon first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) upon second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who knowingly and intentionally violates Subsections (7)(k) 
through (7)(o) shall upon conviction be guilty of a third degree felony. 
(9) Any information communicated to any licensed practitioner in an attempt to un-
lawfully procure, or to procure the administration of, a controlled substance is 
not considered to be a privileged communication. 
Current through 2008 General Session. 
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58-37-6. License to manufacture, produce, distribute, dispense, administer, 
or conduct research — Issuance by department — Denial, suspension, or revo-
cation — Records required — Prescriptions. (1) The department may promul-
gate rules relating to the licensing and control of the manufacture, distribution, 
production, and dispensing of controlled substances within this state. The depart-
ment may assess reasonable fees to defray the cost of issuing original and renewal 
licenses under this chapter pursuant to Subsection 63-38-3(2). The director of the 
department may delegate to any division or agency within the department, author-
ity to perform the responsibilities and functions prescribed to the department 
under this chapter if such delegated authority is consistent with the function of 
the division or agency provided by law. 
(2) (a) Every person who manufactures, produces, distributes, dispenses, 
administers, or conducts research with any controlled substance within this state 
or who proposes to engage in manufacturing, producing, distributing, dispensing, 
administering, or conducting research with controlled substances within this state 
shall obtain a license issued by the department Each license issued under this 
chapter, whether an original or renewal license, shall expire on December 31 of 
each even-numbered year. 
(b) Persons licensed to manufacture, produce, distribute, dispense, administer, 
or conduct research with controlled substances may possess, manufacture, produce, 
distribute, dispense, administer, or conduct research with those substances to the 
extent authorized by their license and in conformity with this chapter. 
(c) The following persons are not required to obtain a license and may lawfully 
possess controlled substances under this section: 
(i) an agent or employee of any registered manufacturer, distributor, or dis-
penser of any controlled substance if the agent or employee is acting in the usual 
course of his business or employment; 
(ii) a common or contract carrier or warehouseman, or an employee thereof, 
whose possession of any controlled substance is in the usual course of his business 
or employment; and 
(iii) an ultimate user or person in possession of any controlled substance pursu-
ant to a lawful order of a practitioner. 
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(d) Tne department by rule may waive the requirement for licensing t& certain 
manufacturers, producers, distributors, dispensers, administrators, or research 
practitioners if consistent with the public health and safety. 
(e) A separate license is required at each principal place of business or profes-
sional practice where the applicant manufactures, produces, distributes, dispenses, 
administers, or conducts research with controlled substances. 
(f) The department may inspect the establishment of a licensee or applicant for 
licensing in accordance with the rules promulgated by i t 
(3) (a) The department shall license an applicant to manufacture, produce, or 
distribute controlled substances included in schedules I through V, unless it deter* 
mines that issuance of a license is inconsistent with the public interest In deter-
mining public interest, the following factors shall be considered: 
(i) maintenance of effective controls against diversion of controlled substances 
and any schedule I or II substance compounded therefrom into other than legiti-
mate medical, scientific, or industrial channels; 
(ii) compliance with applicable state and local law; 
(iii) prior conviction of applicant under federal or state laws relating to the 
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of substances; 
(iv) past experience in the manufacture of controlled dangerous substances and 
the existence in the establishment of effective controls against diversion; and 
(v) any other factors relevant and consistent with the public health and safety. 
(b) Licenses granted under Subsection (3)(a) do not entitle a licensee to manu-
facture or distribute controlled substances in schedule I or II other than those spec-
ified in the license. 
(c) Practitioners shall be licensed to administer, dispense, or conduct research 
with substances in schedules II through V if they are authorized to administer, 
dispense, or conduct research under the laws of this state. The department need 
not require a separate license for practitioners engaging in research with non-
narcotic controlled substances in schedules II through V where the licensee is 
already licensed under this act in another capacity. With respect to research involv-
ing narcotic substances in schedules II through V, or where the department by rule 
requires a separate license for research of non-narcotic substances in schedules II 
through V, a practitioner prior to conducting research shaH make application to 
the department Licensing for purposes of bona fide research with controlled sub-
stances by a practitioner deemed qualified may be denied only on a ground speci-
fied in Subsection (4) or upon evidence that the applicant will abuse or unlawfully 
transfer or fail to safeguard adequately his supply of substances against diversion 
from medical or scientific use. Practitioners registered under federal law to conduct 
research in schedule I substances may conduct research in schedule I substances 
within this state upon furnishing the department evidence of federal registration. 
(d) Compliance by manufacturers, producers, and distributors with the provi-
sions of federal law respecting registration, excluding fees, entitles them to be 
licensed under this chapter. 
(e) The department shall initially license those persons who own or operate an 
establishment engaged in the manufacture, production, distribution, dispensation, 
or administration of controlled substances prior to April 3, 1980 and who are 
licensed by the state. 
(4) (a) A license pursuant to Subsection (2) to manufacture, produce, distribute, 
dispense, administer, or conduct research with a controlled substance may be 
denied, suspended, or revoked by the department upon finding that the applicant 
has: 
(i) materially falsified any application filed or required pursuant to this chap-
ter, 
(ii) been convicted of an offense under this chapter or any law of the United 
States, or any state, relating to any substances defined as a controlled substance; 
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(Hi) been convicted of a felony under any other law of the United States or any 
state within five years of the date of the issuance of the license; 
(iv) had a federal license suspended or revoked by competent federal authority 
and is no longer authorized to engage in the manufacturing, distribution, or dis-
pensing of controlled substances; 
(v) had his license suspended or revoked by competent authority of another 
state for violation of laws or regulations comparable to those of this state relating 
to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled substances; 
(vi) violated any duly promulgated rule of the department which reflects 
adversely on the licensee's reliability and integrity with respect to controlled sub-
stances; or 
(vii) refused inspection of records required to be maintained under this chapter 
by a person authorized to inspect them. 
(b) The department may limit revocation or suspension of a license to a particu-
lar controlled substance with respect to which grounds for revocation or suspension 
exist. 
(c) Proceedings to deny, revoke, or suspend a license shall be conducted pursu-
ant to this section and in accordance with the procedure set forth in Sections 
58-1-26 through 58-1-36, and conducted in conjunction with the appropriate repre-
sentative committee designated by the director of the department Nothing in this 
Subsection (c) gives the Division of [Registration] Occupational and Professional 
Licensing exclusive authority in proceedings to deny, revoke, or suspend licenses, 
except where the department is designated by law to perform such functions or, 
when not so designated by law, is designated by the executive director of the 
Department of Business Regulation to conduct such proceedings. 
(d) The department may suspend any license simultaneously with the institu-
tion of proceedings under this section if it finds there is an imminent danger to 
the public health or safety. Suspension shall continue in effect until the conclusion 
of proceedings including judicial review, unless sooner withdrawn by the depart-
ment or dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
(e) If a license is suspended or revoked under Subsection (4X all controlled sub-
stances owned or possessed by the licensee may be placed under seal in the discre-
tion of the department No disposition may be made of substances under seal until 
the time for taking an appeal has lapsed or until all appeals have been concluded 
unless a court upon application orders the sale of perishable substances and the 
proceeds deposited with the court If a revocation order becomes final, all controlled 
substances shall be forfeited. 
(f) The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs shall be notified promptly 
by the department of all orders suspending or revoking a license and all forfeitures 
of controlled substances. 
(5) (a) Persons licensed to manufacture, produce, distribute, dispense, adminis-
ter, or conduct research with controlled substances shall maintain records and 
inventories in conformance with the record-keeping and inventory requirements of 
federal and state law and any additional rules issued by the department 
(b) Every physician, dentist, veterinarian, practitioner, or other person who is 
authorized to administer or professionally use a controlled substance shall keep a 
record of such drugs received by him and a record of all such drugs administered, 
dispensed, or professionally used by him otherwise than by a prescription. It is 
sufficient compliance with this Subsection (b) if any such person using small quan-
tities or solutions or other preparations of such drugs for local application keeps 
a record of the quantity, character, and potency of such solutions or preparations 
purchased or prepared by him and of the dates when purchased or prepared. 
(6) Controlled substances in schedules I through V may be distributed only by 
a licensee and pursuant to an order form prepared in compliance with department 
rules or a lawful order under the rules and regulations of the United States. 
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(7) (a) No person may write or authorize a prescription for a controlled sub-
stance unless he is: 
(i) a practitioner authorized to prescribe drugs and medicine under the laws 
of this state; and 
(ii) licensed under this chapter. 
(b) No person other than a pharmacist licensed under the laws of this state, 
or his licensed intern, as required by Section 58-17-10, may dispense a controlled 
substance. 
(c) No controlled substance may be dispensed without the written prescription 
Of a practitioner, if such written prescription is required by the federal Controlled 
Substances Act Such written prescription shall be made in accordance with Sub-
section (7)(a) and in conformity with Subsection (7)(d) . In emergency situations 
as defined by rule of the department, controlled substances may be dispensed upon 
oral prescription of a practitioner, if reduced promptly to writing on forms desig-
nated by the department and filed by the pharmacy. Prescriptions reduced to writ-
ing by a pharmacist shall be in conformity with Subsection (7)(d). 
(d) Except for emergency situations designated by the department, no person 
may issue, fill, compound, or dispense a prescription for a controlled substance 
unless the prescription is signed in ink or indelible pencil by the prescriber and 
contains the following information: 
(i) the name, address, and registry number of the prescriber; 
(ii) the name, address, and age of the person to whom or for whom the prescrip-
tion is issued; 
(iii) the date of issuance of the prescription; and 
(iv) the name, quantity, and specific directions for use by the ultimate user of 
the controlled substance. 
(e) No prescription may be written, issued, filled, or dispensed for a schedule 
I controlled substance. 
(f) Except when administered directly to an ultimate user by a licensed practi-
tioner, controlled substances are subject to the following restrictions: 
(i) A prescription for a schedule II substance may be refilled only upon the 
written prescription of an authorized practitioner and no prescription for a sched-
ule II controlled substance may be filled in a quantity to exceed a one-month's sup-
ply, as directed on the daily dosage rate of the prescriptions. 
(ii) A schedule III or IV controlled substance may not be refilled more than 
six months after the date of its original issuance or be refilled more than five times 
after the date of the prescription unless renewed by the practitioner. 
(iii) All other controlled substances in schedule V may be refilled as the 
preseriber's prescription shall direct, but in no event shall they be refilled one year 
after the date the prescription was issued unless renewed by the practitioner. 
(iv) Any prescription for a schedule II, III, and IV substance which is not pre-
sented to a pharmacist for dispensing by a pharmacist or if an oral prescription, 
which is not obtained within ten days of the date the prescription was written or 
authorized, may not be filled or dispensed. 
(h) An order for a controlled substance in schedules II through V for use by 
an inpatient or an outpatient of a licensed hospital is exempt from all requirements 
of Subsection (7) if the order is: 
(i) authorized by the physician treating the patient and designates the quantity 
ordered; 
(ii) duly entered upon the record of the patient and the record is signed by the 
prescriber affirming his authorization of the order within 48 hours after the filling 
or administering the order and the patient's record reflects the quantity actually 
administered; and 
(iii) filled and dispensed by a pharmacist practicing his profession within the 
physical structure of the hospital or the order is taken from a supply lawfully 
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maintained by the hospital and the amount taken from the supply is administered 
directly to the patient authorized to receive i t 
(8) No information communicated to any licensed practitioner in an attempt to 
unlawfully procure, or procure the administration of, a controlled substance is 
deemed to be a privileged communication. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 6; 1972, ch. 21, 
§ 1; 1977, ch. 29, § 5; 1979, ch. 12, § 4; 1980, ch. 
6, §39; 1984 (2nd S.S.), ch. 15, §96; 1985, ch. 
187, §81. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section, as enacted, did not include a 
subsec (7)(g). 
The 1977 amendment redesignated subsec. 
(5) as subsec (5)(a); added subsec (5)(b) 
relating to the receipt and use of controlled 
substances; and added subsec (8) relating to 
the unlawful procurement of controlled sub-
stances. 
The 1979 amendment deleted "of section 
58-37-4" after "schedules I through V" in 
subsec (3)(a); substituted "subsection (4) of 
this section" for "paragraph (4)" in the 
fourth sentence of subsec (3)(c); and rewrote 
the beginning phrase in subsec (4)(e) which 
read: "If a license granted under paragraph 
(4) of this section is suspended or revoked." 
The 1980 amendment substituted "cost of 
issuing original licenses under this act" at 
the end of the second sentence of subsec (1) 
for "costs of issuing licenses within this act"; 
deleted "annually" before "a license issued 
by the department" at the end of the first 
sentence of subsec (2)(a); and added the sec-
ond and third sentences of subsec (2)(a). 
The 1984 (2nd S.S.) amendment substituted 
"chapter" for "act" throughout the section; 
inserted "and renewal" in the second sen-
tence of subsec (1); added "pursuant to Sub-
section 63-38-3(2)" to the second sentence of 
subsec (1); deleted a third sentence of subsec 
(2)(a) which read: "An applicant for a 
renewal license shall pay a fee to the depart-
ment of not less than $5 nor more than $20"; 
substituted "April 3, 1980" for "the effective 
date of this act" in subsec (3)(e); substituted 
"Division of Registration" for "department 
of business registration" in the second sen-
tence of subsec (4)(c); and made minor 
changes in phraseology, punctuation and 
style. 
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c 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 58. OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
CHAPTER 37. UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 
_>§ 58-37-7.5. Controlled substance database--Pharmacy reporting requirements-
-Access--Penalties 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Board" means the Utah State Board of Pharmacy created in Section 58- 17b-201. 
(b) "Database" means the controlled substance database created in this section. 
(c) "Database manager" means the person responsible for operating the database, 
or the person's designee. 
(d) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
created in Section 58-1-103. 
(e) "Health care facility" is as defined in Section 26-21-2. 
(f) "Pharmacy" or "pharmaceutical facility" is as defined in Section 58-17b-102. 
(2)(a) There is created within the division a controlled substance database. 
(b) The division shall administer and direct the functioning of the database in 
accordance with this section. The division may under state procurement laws 
contract with another state agency or private entity to establish, operate, or 
maintain the database. The division in collaboration with the board shall de-
termine whether to operate the database within the division or contract with an-
other entity to operate the database, based on an analysis of costs and bene-
fits. 
(c) The purpose of the database is to contain data as described in this section 
regarding every prescription for a controlled substance dispensed in the state 
to any person other than an inpatient in a licensed health care facility. 
(d) Data required by this section shall be submitted in compliance with this 
section to the manager of the database by the pharmacist in charge of the drug 
outlet where the controlled substance is dispensed. 
(3) The board shall advise the division regarding: 
(a) establishing, maintaining, and operating the database; 
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(b) access to the database and how access is obtained; and 
(c) control of information contained in the database. 
(4) The pharmacist in charge shall, regarding each controlled substance dispensed 
by a pharmacist under the pharmacist's supervision other than those dispensed for 
an inpatient at a health care facility, submit to the manager of the database the 
following information, by a procedure and in a format established by the division: 
(a) name of the prescribing practitioner; 
(b) date of the prescription; 
(c) date the prescription was filled; 
(d) name of the person for whom the prescription was written; 
(e) positive identification of the person receiving the prescription, including 
the type of identification and any identifying numbers on the identification; 
(f) name of the controlled substance; 
(g) quantity of controlled substance prescribed; 
(h) strength of controlled substance; 
(i) quantity of controlled substance dispensed; 
(j) dosage quantity and frequency as prescribed; 
(k) name of drug outlet dispensing the controlled substance; 
(1) name of pharmacist dispensing the controlled substance; and 
(m) other relevant information as required by division rule. 
(5) The division shall maintain the database in an electronic file or by other 
means established by the division to facilitate use of the database for identific-
ation of: 
(a) prescribing practices and patterns of prescribing and dispensing controlled 
substances; 
(b) practitioners prescribing controlled substances in an unprofessional or un-
lawful manner; 
(c) individuals receiving prescriptions for controlled substances from licensed 
practitioners, and who subsequently obtain dispensed controlled substances from 
a drug outlet in quantities or with a frequency inconsistent with generally re-
cognized standards of dosage for that controlled substance; and 
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(d) individuals presenting forged or otherwise false or altered prescriptions 
for controlled substances- to a pharmacy. 
(6)(a) The division shall by rule establish the electronic format in which the in-
formation required under this section shall be submitted to the administrator of 
the database. 
(b) The division shall ensure the database system records and maintains for ref-
erence : 
(i) identification of each person who requests or receives information from the 
database; 
(ii) the information provided to each person; and 
(iii) the date and time the information is requested or provided. 
(7) The division shall make rules to: 
(a) effectively enforce the limitations on access to the database as described 
in Subsection (8); and 
(b) establish standards and procedures to ensure accurate identification of in-
dividuals requesting information or receiving information without request from 
the database. 
(8) The manager of the database shall make information in the database available 
only to the following persons, and in accordance with the limitations stated and 
division rules: 
(a) personnel of the division specifically assigned to conduct investigations 
related to controlled substances laws under the jurisdiction of the division; 
(b) authorized division personnel engaged in analysis of controlled substance 
prescription information as a part of the assigned duties and responsibilities 
of their employment; 
(c) employees of the Department of Health whom the director of the Department of 
Health assigns to conduct scientific studies regarding the use or abuse of con-
trolled substances, provided that the identity of the individuals and pharmacies 
in the database are confidential and are not disclosed in any manner to any in-
dividual who is not directly involved in the scientific studies; 
(d) a licensed practitioner having authority to prescribe controlled substances, 
to the extent: 
(i) the information relates specifically to a current patient of the practi-
tioner, to whom the practitioner is prescribing or considering prescribing any 
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controlled substance; 
(ii) the information relates specifically to an individual who has access to 
the practitioner's Drug Enforcement Administration number, and the practitioner 
suspects that the individual may have used the practitioner's Drug Enforcement 
Administration identification number to fraudulently acquire or prescribe con-
trolled substances; or 
(iii) the information relates to the practitioner's own prescribing practices, 
except when specifically prohibited by the division by administrative rule; 
(e) a licensed pharmacist having authority to dispense controlled substances to 
the extent the information relates specifically to a current patient to whom 
that pharmacist is dispensing or considering dispensing any controlled sub-
stance; 
(f) federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities, and state and local 
prosecutors, engaged as a specified duty of their employment in enforcing laws: 
(i) regulating controlled substances; or 
(ii) investigating insurance fraud, Medicaid fraud, or Medicare fraud; and 
(g) an individual who is the recipient of a controlled substance prescription 
entered into the database, upon providing evidence satisfactory to the database 
manager that the individual requesting the information is in fact the person 
about whom the data entry was made. 
(9) Any person who knowingly and intentionally releases any information in the 
database in violation of the limitations under Subsection (8) is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(10)(a) Any person who obtains or attempts to obtain information from the database 
by misrepresentation or fraud is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(b) Any person who obtains or attempts to obtain information from the database 
for a purpose other than a purpose authorized by this section or by rule is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(11) (a) A person may not knowingly and intentionally use, release, publish, or 
otherwise make available to any other person or entity any information obtained 
from the database for any purpose other than those specified in Subsection (8). 
Each separate violation of this Subsection (11) is a third degree felony and is 
also subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $5,000. 
(b) The procedure for determining a civil violation of this Subsection (11) 
shall be in accordance with Section 58-1-108, regarding adjudicative proceedings 
within the division. 
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(c) Civil penalties assessed under this Subsection (11) shall be deposited in 
the General Fund as a dedicated credit to be used by the division under Subsec-
tion 58-37-7.7(1). 
(12)(a) The failure of a pharmacist in charge to submit information to the data-
base as required under this section after the division has submitted a specific 
written request for the information or when the division determines the individual 
has a demonstrable pattern of failing to submit the information as required is 
grounds for the division to take the following actions in accordance with Section 
58-1-401: 
(i.) refuse to issue a license to the individual; 
(ii) refuse to renew the individual's license; 
(iii) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation the license; 
(iv) issue a public or private reprimand to the individual; 
(v) issue a cease and desist order; and 
(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 for each dispensed pre-
scription regarding which the required information is not submitted. 
(b) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection (12)(a)(vi) shall be deposited in 
the General Fund as a dedicated credit to be used by the division under Subsec-
tion 58-37-7.7(1). 
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of this Subsection (12) 
shall be in accordance with Section 58-1-108, regarding adjudicative proceedings 
within the division. 
(13) An individual who has submitted information to the database in accordance 
with this section may not be held civilly liable for having submitted the informa-
tion. 
(14) All department and the division costs necessary to establish and operate the 
database shall be funded by appropriations from: 
(a) the Commerce Service Fund; and 
(b) the General Fund. 
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting data as required in this 
section shall be assumed by the submitting pharmacy. 
(16) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (16) (b) , data provided to, maintained in, 
or accessed from the database that may be identified to, or with, a particular 
person is not subject to discovery, subpoena, or similar compulsory process in any 
2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-7.5 
civil, judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding, nor shall any indi-
vidual or organization with lawful access to the data be compelled to testify with 
regard to the data. 
(b) The restrictions in Subsection (16)(a) do not apply to: 
(i) a criminal proceeding; or 
(ii) a civil, judicial, or administrative action brought to enforce the provi-
sions of this section, Section 58-37-7,7, or Section 58-37-7.8. 
Current through 2008 General Session. 
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c 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 58. OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
CHAPTER 37. UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 
«^ § 58-37-8. Prohibited acts--Penalties 
(1) Prohibited acts A--Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to know-
ingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in 
any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 
37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations 
of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that 
are undertaken in concert with five or more persons with respect to whom the 
person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of 
management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (1) (a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, 
or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second de-
gree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first de-
gree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a 
third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a 
second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
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(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (1)(a)(ii) or 
(iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by 
law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76- 10-501 
was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate possession 
during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court shall addi-
tionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecut-
ively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person 
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecut-
ively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (1)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first 
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less 
than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sen-
tence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B--Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a val-
id prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the 
course of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, 
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and inten-
tionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, 
or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or 
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second de-
gree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is 
more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance ana-
log, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from 
any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent 
to a conviction under Subsection (1) (a) , that person shall be sentenced to a one 
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degree greater penally t ha: ;• n r o v i d e d. i n thi s Subsection (2) . 
(d) Any person who violates Subsectior , ' . : i * - - -..._._-. 
trolled substances •:••:): included in Subsection t2) . ;: < , h i ) , ?r < iii> , inc.ud-
ing less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon 
a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a 
third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felcny. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while insice the ex-
terior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined 
in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be 
sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), 
and if the conviction is with respect to controlled substances as listed i in 
Subsection (2) (b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an inde-
terminate t e rm a s p rov i de d by 1 aw,, and i 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of 
one year to run consecuti vely and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted fci an indeterm-
inate term nrr *-- ex reed r.,e veais to run runsecut ively and o: • cur-
rent ly; and 
(ii) Suhsectiv.,^ ,.-. . %<*, , uuc- peiboii •
 2 .itr ^ en^eii •-u I O imp -i : _i ...n in-
determinate term as provided by law and the court shall a. -ally ser.ter.ce 
the person convicted -_c n * - -m f - :\ >r - : s onsecuu.ively and no:: c.n-
ci irrent] y. 
U ) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2) (a) (i i ) or (2) (a) (i i i ) is: 
( i ) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
: •
 T
 , a s e c o n d c o n v i c t i on , gu i 11 y t:»f a c l a s s A m i s d P m e a TI e ; i I  
i .Dsequent conviction, guilty ol a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2) (h) who, :i n an of-
fense not amo1 ir.^^^n r~ ^  ^ ^r* -~-"! -\f" \ or ~** nr ~*~ z on 76 5 2 0' 7 i 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in his 
b o dy any me a s u r ab 3 e a m o u n t of a r -• -• n t • - n 11 e d s u b s t a n c e ; a n d 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as del izi^d in Section 76-5-2 07 in a negligent 
manner, causing serious bodily ininr/ as defined in Secti on 76-1 -60] or the 
death of another. 
(n) ^ person who violates Subsection U'. -' l* '••--- - m his body: 
© 
- .-ks. 
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(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those de-
scribed in Subsection (2) (h) (ii), or a controlled substance classified under 
Schedule II is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 
58-37-4(2) (a) (iii) (S) or (AA) is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Prohibited acts C--Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled 
substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued 
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to 
assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, 
apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the 
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to 
any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to 
procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation or 
failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance from 
another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a pre-
scription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false 
name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a con-
trolled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or writ-
ten order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other 
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or 
other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of 
the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render any drug a 
counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third de-
gree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D--Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized 
under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this sec-
tion, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, 
Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to 
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the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact 
finds the act is committed: 
i :i a pu::l . " or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of 
.j -..r those s::ools; 
(ii) -n a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or 
- *•'.-- -.rour-dr- - f" .".'. of those school s or institutions; 
(iii) , n those portions of any building., park, st
 td: :m, cr of her structure or 
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being -.jt-i for an activity sponsored 
by or through a school or institution under S u l — •- (4 M a M i ) and (ii) ; 
s : f s pi eschoo] : r i ; 
-* ,:.•_.. " . amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
'vi) .in - r :n the grounds of a house of worship ar> /i*--fined in Sectior -n Is, 501; 
(vii; :• "i a shopping .!-_;_..., sports :„-*. iiity, stj.di-..lf .^.^ .^ ,^ ^ „ * . 2 
house playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
•••
; ; ;
 •" • • -rinds of ' "* 
fix) within any area that is witniL 1, „ ^  _ , " any stru.ct.ure, facility, or 
grounds included, in Subsections (4^ fi) 'As ' 2 v) , (vi ) , and (vij ) ; 
(x) i 11 t he presence o f a p e 1: s on y oung e 1: In h a 11 1 8 } e a 1: s o f a ge, r e g a rd 1 e s s o f 
where the act occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, de-
livery, or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an in-
mate or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section 
- -
i
 -« -> 
(D) (1) A peison convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this Subsection. (4) 
would have b,=sor, r ~f dec;: -^  f M 
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the per-
son i c not eligible f^^ r^ vh?4":"?. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have 
been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person con-
victed under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximi riit 
penalty prescribed for that offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a 
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violation of Subsection (2)(g). 
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person con-
victed for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterm-
inate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concur-
rently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, 
acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense, dir-
ectly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or in-
tentionally aids another person to commit a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the act-
or mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time 
of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor 
mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as de-
scribed in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act oc-
curred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(6) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections (1)(b) and (2)(c), a 
plea of guilty or no contest to a violation of this section which is held in abey-
ance under Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a convic-
tion, even if the charge has been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance 
with the plea in abeyance agreement. 
(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section, not-
withstanding a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this 
chapter. 
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another 
state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for 
the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dis-
pensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the per-
son or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or sub-
® 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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stances. 
(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian. u u :od fairh ard i. * i 
course of his professional practice only and not foi hu-r.a'.is, frcm presc: : bj ~ig, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances 
to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction ard ? peivision. 
( I 1 ) iv i 1 i i' i m i M a I I i a b i I i I y in.i y i! \ I'M i my n : 
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or 
possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investiga-
tional new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of profes-
sional practice or research; or • 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his 
employment. 
:a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any 
an, as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(1) (v), who uses, possesses, or transports 
?te for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the prac-
tice ::: f a trad i t i ona 1 Ind i an r e 1 i g i o n a s de f i n e d i n S ub s e c t i on 5 6 - 3 7-2 ; '• : *'" 
.; . • i prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as 
defined In Subsection 58-37-4(2) (a) (iii) (V), it is an affirmative defense that 
the peyote was used, possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide tradi-
tional ceremonial, purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional In-
dian religion. 
(c) (i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirm-
ative defense under this Subsection (1 2) as soon as practicab1e, but not 1ater 
than ten days prior to trial. 
e ii ::»t :ii c e s h a "I 3 i n c 3 n i c:i e t h 2 S p e c :1 f i c c 1 a iins c :!: t 111e a £ f i rma t i ve de f e ns e . 
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for 
good cause shown, -if ^ ^° ^ rosecut/^ *f- not unfa^- 1" -r^judiced by the lack of 
timely notice. 
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection 
(12) by a preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a 
complete defense to the charges. 
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provisi on to any 
person or circumstances, is held invalid., the remainder of this chapter shal 1 be 
given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
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Case No: 061100071 
Judge: Thoiriius L Willmore 
t'HE ABOVE MA ITER is before the Court pursuant ••* Defendant's Motion tc Quooix 
;^  iwuuuiu » \^;i.on,Uetendui.i s AiuuoidaiJain Support. 
Plaintiffs Memoranda in n ™ ^ ".-< r and ielevant case 1 /* v 
also heard oral arguments on this maner Jamury ?., 7007 
I Hi September ,?() 'Illlh, • . ..-in requesting additional 
In Icfing by the parties concerning the issue of whether U.C.A. § 58-37-6(°) is an unconstitutional 
exception to the Rule 1)06 privilege because the statute violates the separation of powers 
provision of the Utah Conslilulion \rfirlr VIII l\ I mid pm .n ml li ]Um\s v ihnth n, .'INNi 11 I I I 
f 1 5, nX The parties have briefed 'and. argued this issue. 
elates: 
The Supreme Court, shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in I he 
courts of the state and., shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature 
may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court: 
upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the Legislature. 
-! it -cgislativc history of TTtah Code Ann. § 58-37-6(9) is undisputed. The bill was passed 
•
:






 - - • • - I egislati ve history shows that 
1 
section 58-37-6(9) was considered by the Utah State Senate on Friday, January 25, 2002, which 
passed it by 72%. The bill was sent to the House on Monday, February 25, 2002, which passed it 
by over 94%. 
The critical issue in this matter is whether the Legislature complied with Article VIII, § 4 of 
the Utah Constitution in passing 58-37-6(9) which amended Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
by creating an exception to the privilege. The State asserts that the Legislature complied with Article 
Vin, § 4 because U.C.A § 58-37-6(9) was passed by more than a two-thirds vote of both houses of 
the legislature. The Defendant asserts that in order for U.C.A. § 58-37-6(9) to be constitutional the 
Legislature was required to understand and intend to amend the Rule 506 privilege. 
A careful reading of Article VDI, § 4 does not contain any requirement of intent to amend 
or an understanding by the Legislature that they are amending a rule controlled by the Supreme 
Court. Article VDI, § 4 simply allows a rule amendment by a two-thirds vote of both houses. 
However, in maintaining the separation of powers between the Legislative branch and the 
Judicial branch, the Court must look to whether the Legislature was aware it was amending a rule 
controlled by the Judiciary. In making this determination the only indication is in the language of 
§ 58-37-6(9) where it states: "Any information communicated to any licensed practitioner in an 
attempt to unlawfully procure, or to procure the administration of, a controlled substance is not 
considered to be a privileged communication." (emphasis added.) The specific language "privileged 
communication" persuades the Court to believe the Legislature recognized that the passing of § 58-
37-6(9) would affected privileged communications and more specifically amend Rule 506. 
In the case of Roosevelt City Corp, v. Nebeker, 815 P.2d 738 (Utah Ct. Of App. 1991) the 
2 
1.1 >iirLi slates, It is also a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes 'are endowed 
with a strong presumption of validity; and should nui ' ^  nconstitn 
reasonable basis upon, which they can be found to come witinr . : ame work i >i« 1.'" 
i"l lurnj\ I 'it\ i Hall, Ub I i" M I i 11,1 11 "' |1 H.ili I'"JX \ i muuiiuy urta\esv. .*:„„, ^~b ;' .,., v 
(Utah 1974)). 
Il I in it luic, based upon, the above, the Court finds the statute to be valid and : at 
'because 
followed the Legislature pursuant to Article VIII, § 4, 
' I lie Court" s decision, is further supported by the case of State v AnU^ .>.>/«, - /_ . _a 8b 89 
(Ut App. 1998). In "that case, the Court of Appeals considered the - * - * * " / : 
xbe physician/patient privilege of Rule ^Oofn\ The Co:*:? <>f "-^veais uphelu the exception *lie 
/ ; .1- '^ - - u<^ J . . W , .jeienaant 
was attempting to commit a fraud by manipulating the privilege to protect Ms fraud. Id. at 89. Also, 
•~V«rt mku •.,.; \ijdurson * .unure to withhold information from his doctors was, "not 
does not fall within the scope of the privilege." Id. at 89. 
: . . .. .. .. ;s auempim^ to use the privilege to protect her 
alleged fraud. Also, the Court finds that Johnson's failure to inform her doctor of other prescriptions 
from,, other physicians is not a communication in confidence for the purpose of diagnoses or 
Therefore, the Court finds that sufficient and admissible evidence was presented at the 
preliminary hearing to bind Defendant over. 
3 
Therefore, the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Quash and Motion in Limine. The 
State is directed to prepare an order in conformance herewith. This matter is hereby set for a 
pretrial conference on February 6, 2007, at 1:30 p.m. 
Dated this [ \ day of January, 2007 
BY THE COURT 
/ O g ^ u ^ 
First District Court 
4 
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Deputy Court Clerk 
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Case No: 061100071 
Judge:' I homasl , W illmore 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Defendant's Motion In limine. 
Memoranda in Opposition, Defendant's Reply and relevant case law and statutory provisions. 
On September 20, 2006, the Court, issued a Memorandum,. Decision requesting additional 
exception to the Rule 506 privilege because the statute violates the separationi :: f powers 
provision of the Utah Constitution .Article V Ill, § 4 and pursuant to iiu.iu v. *.. \ **t ^,.- *> > 
"f 1 5, n.3. The parties briefed and argued this issue. 
The Court, issued a Memorandum. Decision on January 19, 2007, regarding this issue and 
denied DcibnddJil s MHIIMM in f »i.n.,Ji Ituiidoyi i and Inuiid llul I I ( <\ § >h .V t»|lM th mil JII 
unconstitutional exception to Ri»!«' yj6 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Defendant's Motion <h \ miine asserts the same issues and,, asks the Court to reconsider 
ih Otdn iwnnlnii hiiiiaiy I1) Mill/ I'hr < \ntii finds it tins ndnl inn llirsc issues in \\v I'linnry 
19,2007, Memorandum Decision and. it will not reconsider its ruling. 
Ir'} 
However, Defendant raises one new issue in her Motion in Limine. Defendant cites 
Sorensen v. Barbuto, 143 P.3d 295 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) and then states, "the Utah Court held 
that a physician cannot, within the proscriptions of the patient-physician privilege, supply 
information without prior notification to the patient How then, can a Doctor appear pursuant to 
a Subpoena or otherwise, without allowing his patient to appear and assert the privilege and/or 
invoke civil remedies." Defendant's Memorandum at page 7. 
The Court agrees with the State concerning the interpretation and application of the 
Barbuto Case. The Court finds that Sorensen v. Barbuto is not applicable to this case and the 
issues raised. The facts of Barbuto are completely different and involve a civil case. 
Defendant's argument also fails because the Court ruled in the January 19,2007, Memorandum 
Decision that the statutory exception in U.C.A. § 58-37-6(9) applies to Defendant's asserted 
privilege. 
Defendant seems to assert that a doctor must first notify the patient before confidential 
patient information is disclosed to the police or the doctor breaches his fiduciary duty to the 
patient which in turn constitutes a due process violation. The Court finds that the exception set 
forth in U.C.A. § 58-37-6(9) does not require notification to the patient before disclosure by a 
doctor. The Court further finds that disclosure by a doctor without notification does not violate 
Defendants Due Process rights. 
2 
I "he Court lias prc\ iuuJ> addressed the other issues raised by Defend*...:. —.. ~ ^... 'he 
Court's prior rulings and the issues addressed in this Motion, the Court denies Defendant's 
Motion in Limine. Counsel for the State Is directed to prepare an order conforming to this 
Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this / Cday of June, 2007, 
IIV IMliCOUKI 
3 
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